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I. STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
All parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief through their 
counsel.  (See CAFC Rule 29(a)).  No party’s counsel authored the brief in whole 
or in part, and no party, party’s counsel, or person—other than the amici curiae, 
their members, or their counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund 
preparing or submitting the brief. 
A. Individual Organizational Interests 
 
March of Dimes Foundation is a non-profit organization dedicated to 
improving the health of babies by preventing birth defects, premature births, and 
infant mortality.  For over 70 years, March of Dimes has carried out its mission 
through research, community services, education, and advocacy, originally to fight 
polio and, for the past 50 years, more generally to save babies’ lives.  March of 
Dimes funded Jonas Salk’s revolutionary research into polio vaccine.  On the day 
the field tests were pronounced a success, Edward R. Murrow interviewed Salk 
live on his television show.  “Who owns the patent on this vaccine?” Murrow 
asked.  “Well, the people, I would say,” Salk replied, “There is no patent. Could 
you patent the sun?” 
Historically, March of Dimes has played an important role in the key 
advances of genetics, having donated substantial funds in seed money to the early 
research of James Watson, resulting in his milestone discovery of the double helix 
2 
structure of DNA.  Today, March of Dimes funds research into genetic diseases 
and therapies, among many other fields.  March of Dimes’ mission and research 
are directly adversely affected by patents on gene sequences and correlations with 
disease, like the patents-in-suit. 
Canavan Foundation is a non-profit organization founded by the parents 
and friends of children affected by the Canavan disease.  Canavan disease is a rare 
but fatal, inherited degenerative brain disorder that primarily affects children of 
eastern and central European Jewish (Ashkenazi) descent.  The disease causes loss 
of body control and death, generally before the children reach their teens.  The 
Canavan Foundation’s mission is to provide funding for research efforts to find an 
effective therapy, raise awareness of the disease, and to help avoid Canavan 
disease through carrier screening and prenatal testing.  Although it is believed that 
research advances may eventually lead to treatments or even a cure, there is 
currently no cure for the disease.  Genetic testing is an important part of prevention 
and early detection. 
However, low-cost carrier screening and prenatal testing programs for 
families at risk for Canavan disease were stopped by the holder of the patent on the 
Canavan gene based on patent claims very similar to those in this case. 
Claire Altman Heine Foundation (CAHF) is a non-profit organization and 
a publicly supported charity.  The Foundation is dedicated to establishing 
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population-based pan-ethnic carrier screening for Spinal Muscular Atrophy 
(SMA), which is the number one genetic killer of children under two.  The 
Foundation aims to raise awareness by educating the public and medical 
communities, and it works closely with medical associations, genetic counselors, 
leading SMA researchers, clinicians, laboratories, the NIH, Congress, industry and 
federal agencies such as the National Human Genome Research Institute, and 
others in the field of genetics research, prevention, treatment, and counseling. 
In CAHF’s direct experience, the enforcement and use of patent rights 
relating to the gene responsible for SMA, similar to the patent claims at issue in 
this case, adversely affects clinical access to SMA carrier screening. 
Massachusetts Breast Cancer Coalition (MBCC) is dedicated to 
eradication of breast cancer, particularly through understanding the interaction of 
genes and environmental toxins.  MBCC supports research into a wider variety of 
genetic interactions for diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer.  One of the 
organization’s primary goals is to help assure equal access to treatment and testing 
for breast cancer.  Myriad’s BRCA sequence patents and BRCA correlation patents 
interfere with the goals of MBCC in preventing and eliminating breast cancer, 
diagnosing women predisposed to breast cancer, or testing pregnant women 
interested in prenatal genetic testing, by restricting access to affordable genetic 
diagnostic testing. 
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National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD) is a non-profit 
federation of voluntary health organizations dedicated to helping people with rare 
or “orphan” diseases.  An “orphan” disease is one that affects fewer than 200,000 
people in the United States.  There are more than 6,000 rare disorders that, taken 
together, affect approximately 25 million Americans.  NORD assists health 
organizations, and is committed to the identification, treatment, and cure of rare 
disorders through programs of education, advocacy, research, and service.  NORD 
provides information about diseases, referrals to patient organizations and support 
groups, research grants and fellowships, and advocacy for the rare-disease 
community.  For almost twenty years, NORD has served as the primary non-
governmental clearinghouse for information on rare disorders. 
Many rare disorders are genetic in nature and, in NORD’s experience, 
patents on gene sequences and correlations have a significant adverse impact on 
NORD’s mission. 
National Tay-Sachs & Allied Diseases Association (NTSAD) is a 
nonprofit organization founded in 1957 by the parents of children afflicted with 
Tay-Sachs, Canavan and related genetic diseases, as well as other lysosomal 
storage diseases and leukodystrophies.  In general, these are progressive, 
degenerative disorders that cause loss of body control and death.  
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NTSAD’s mission is to support research aimed at treating and curing these 
diseases, and to provide support for the individuals and families afflicted with 
these diseases.  NTSAD strives to ensure that carrier screening for Tay-Sachs, 
Canavan, and other related diseases is readily available.  Patent rights, like those of 
Myriad, limit clinical access to carrier screening for this family of diseases and the 
ability to conduct research for new treatments and cures. 
B. Allowing Patents on Human Gene Sequences Stifles Innovation 
and Adversely Affects Patient Groups 
 
This case exemplifies how too much patent protection can impede our 
collective efforts to minimize the pain and suffering caused by fatal diseases.1  
Patents like those at issue raise testing costs and simultaneously stifle the 
development of more accurate and reliable diagnostic tools.  The results are 
concretely and tragically experienced by patients and their families whose 
suffering might have been minimized or prevented altogether by more effective 
and less expensive means of testing for the genetic disposition to certain life 
threatening diseases.  It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the consequences 
of affording patent protection to human genes can be lethal. 

1 As with the BRCA genes, the genes responsible for other diseases such as Tay-
Sachs disease, Canavan disease and Spinal Muscular Atrophy, are subject to 
similar patent claims to the gene sequences themselves and bare correlations. 
6 
Myriad2 argues that upholding the district court’s opinion would impede 
innovation and compromise patient diagnosis and treatment.  Myriad Br. 3-4.  But 
there is no factual or evidentiary support for Myriad’s assertions.  To the contrary, 
unless the district court’s decision is upheld, the result will be less research, 
deficiency in diagnosing diseases, and worse outcomes for patients.   
The impact that patenting genes has on research is like that of a patent on an 
element from the periodic table.  (A2446).3  That is, it deprives researchers of the 
ability to make unrestricted use of the most basic information known to 
humankind.  If medical knowledge and testing is to advance, these basic building 
blocks must be free to all.  (A2448).  This is particularly true because, as any 
researcher in the field will readily admit, there are untold discoveries to be made 
about genes.  (Id.)   
Under current USPTO policy, one can patent a human gene even though one 
does not know or chose to reveal all that might be known about that patented gene.  
Yet, such a patent limits other research that may lead to a better understanding of 
that gene.  In this case, Myriad’s patents give it the exclusive right to perform 
genetic testing and research on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in the United States.  
(A2727).  But Myriad cannot claim that it currently knows all there is to be known 

2“Myriad” as used herein refers to all appellants. 
 
3 Citations in the form “A  ” refer to Joint Appendix pages. 
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about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and particularly the mutations thereto.  
Indeed, Myriad reports to many patients that they have an alteration in a BRCA 
gene but that the alteration has “unknown significance.”  (A2938).  The patient 
does not know—and Myriad cannot tell the patient because it does not know—
whether this alteration is correlated with an increased risk of cancer.  Yet, Myriad 
is the only entity that the patient can look to for such answers because of its right to 
exclude others from researching and utilizing certain genetic sequences under the 
patents.4 
Moreover, Myriad is in sole control of how or whether any new research 
will be incorporated into the tests that it offers—the only tests offered in the United 
States.  (A2709).  In light of its monopoly, Myriad lacks the competitive incentive 
to reinvent its test promptly and as necessary to reflect up-to-date research (or, for 
that matter, to offer its test at a reasonable price).  (A2710). 
Not only does Myriad control what type of tests to offer, it controls who 
qualifies for the tests.  (A2650-51).  For example, Myriad initially delayed offering 
a test for large rearrangements that its full sequencing test would miss, which it 
calls BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test (“BART”).  (A2650).  When it finally 

4 In fact, Myriad has accused other laboratories of infringement simply for 
analyzing the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, not because they were using a particular 
test that Myriad had developed.  (A2851).  One survey showed that more than 50% 
of lab directors decided not to develop a clinical test as a result of concerns over a 
gene patent or license.  (A2672). 
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began offering this additional test in 2006—years after its patents issued—it 
imposed strict criteria on which patients would receive it.  (A2651).  Those who do 
not meet Myriad’s criteria usually must pay out-of-pocket for BART, as it is not 
covered by Medicare or many insurance policies.  (A2651).  As a consequence, it 
is Myriad’s judgment, and not a patient’s doctor’s judgment, that often determines 
whether BART is available for a patient.  (A2651).  Myriad’s sole control over the 
only available tests related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in the United States 
thus impedes a doctor’s ability to diagnose and treat a patient.  (A2557).  The 
consequences of this interference are especially problematic for patients who need 
multiple genetic tests that can each be provided only by a patent holder.  At best, it 
is inefficient and expensive to send a patient’s blood or tissue sample to multiple 
laboratories for genetic tests; at worst, there may simply not be enough of the 
patient’s sample to “split up” among multiple laboratories, forcing the patient’s 
doctor to forego testing that would otherwise be ordered. 
There can be no doubt that Myriad’s monopoly worsens patient outcomes.  
Many cannot afford Myriad’s test and are left with no test option.  Others who 
receive Myriad’s test are left with uncertain outcomes (such as when they learn 
they have variants of unknown significance).  All are prohibited from seeking a 
second opinion or confirmatory test results from a different provider.  And all are 
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subject to Myriad’s sole discretion in determining what test is even offered and at 
what cost. 
In light of the foregoing, it cannot be credibly claimed that patient diagnosis 
and treatment will suffer if the district court’s decision is affirmed.  Nor is the 
reward of a patent necessary to encourage innovation in the field.5  (A2675).  A 
patent on a gene does not foster innovation.  To the contrary, the value of the gene 
lies in the sequences created by nature (whether wild-type or mutations).  (A2618).  
Such sequences cannot be improved upon, nor can they be designed around: “it is 
the sequence created by nature that is the entire point of the gene.”  (A2618).  
Patents on genes thus do not advance the constitutional goals of the patent system, 
but instead obstruct them. 
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Patent Claims in Suit 
 
This case addresses 15 claims from 7 patents.  These claims are generally 
categorized into (1) composition of matter claims for “isolated DNA” and (2) 
method claims for “comparing” and “analyzing.” 
Claims 1 and 2 of the ’282 patent are representative of the composition 
claims in suit.  They cover: 

5 The United States government’s funding for breast cancer research was $90 
million in fiscal year 1990; it had grown to $2.5 billion for fiscal year 2008.  
(A2700). 
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1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said 
polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ 
ID NO:2. 
 
2. The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein said DNA has the 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. 
 
Claim 1 of the ’999 patent and claim 20 of ’282 patent are representative of 
the method claims in suit.   
Claim 1 of the ’999 patent covers: 
A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said 
alteration selected from the group consisting of the alterations set 
forth in Tables l2A, 14, 18 or 19 in a human which comprises 
analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 RNA from a 
human sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from 
mRNA from said human sample with the proviso that said germline 
alteration is not a deletion of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base 
numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ ID NO:1. 
 
Claim 20 of the ’282 patent covers:  
A method for screening potential cancer therapeutics which 
comprises: growing a transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an 
altered BRCA1 gene causing cancer in the presence of a compound 
suspected of being a cancer therapeutic, growing said transformed 
eukaryotic host cell in the absence of said compound, determining the 
rate of growth of said host cell in the presence of said compound and 
the rate of growth of said host cell in the absence of said compound 
and comparing the growth rate of said host cells, wherein a slower 
rate of growth of said host cell in the presence of said compound is 
indicative of a cancer therapeutic. 
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B. Isolated DNA is Not Patent Eligible Subject Matter Under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 
 
The district court held that Myriad’s composition claims are invalid because 
they seek to monopolize products of nature that are ineligible for patent protection 
as established under a long line of U.S. Supreme Court precedents.  The district 
court determined that the subject matter of these claims, “isolated DNA,” did not 
possess markedly different characteristics from DNA as it occurs naturally in the 
human body.  (A228).  Central to the Court’s determination is its conclusion, 
drawn from an analysis of key precedents, that the process of extracting DNA 
sequences from human cells and (in some cases) further purifying DNA sequences 
to eliminate noncoding portions “cannot transform it [DNA] into patentable subject 
matter.”  (A214).  This applies to cDNA as well as isolated DNA; in both cases the 
claimed invention is nothing other than a sequence of nucleotides that function 
exactly as nature intended and in the same manner as they did before extraction 
and purification. 
1. The District Court Properly Relied on the Established 
Exclusion for Products of Nature 
 
Despite the broad language set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101, the scope of what is 
eligible for patent protection is not limitless.  The U.S. Supreme Court consistently 
has recognized boundaries of eligibility for patent protection by identifying general 
areas and subjects that are off limits to private monopolization.  These subjects for 
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exclusion are often described in terms including “natural phenomena,” “laws of 
nature” and “abstract ideas.”  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).  But the Supreme Court has used other 
phrases such as “products of nature,”6 “physical phenomena”7 and “forces of 
nature”8 interchangeably with “natural phenomena” and “laws of nature.” 
The rationale behind such exceptions is rooted in the idea that innovation 
requires unfettered access to a strata of basic concepts and natural phenomena that 
are prerequisite to and foundational of any advances in science and commerce.  In 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), the U.S. Supreme 
Court reiterated this point on its way to declaring products of nature unpatentable.  
“Patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature...[They] are 
part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.  They are manifestations of laws of 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”  Id. at 130.  Justice 
Breyer’s recent statements in the Metabolite case further elaborate on the reasons 
for recognizing these exceptions to patentable subject matter. 
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that “laws 
of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are 
not useful.  To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly 

6 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001); 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980). 
 
7 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
 
8 Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 532 (1888). 
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and time-consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits 
of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the 
human race.  Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes 
too much patent protection can impede rather than “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of 
patent and copyright protection. 
 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  As Justice Breyer’s comment suggests, the grant of a 
private monopoly through the issuance of a patent is not intrinsically beneficial; 
there are cases of “too much patent protection,” and patents on universal 
principles, abstract ideas, and the basic elements of nature are paradigmatic of such 
cases. 
2. Under Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty, Isolated Human Gene 
Sequences are not Patentable Subject Matter 
 
In Funk Bros., the patent applicant claimed a new product for inoculating 
plants comprising six well-recognized species of bacteria.  This product could be 
used on many different types of plants because of the applicant’s alleged discovery 
that certain strains of root-nodule bacteria do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect 
on each other.  By virtue of this discovery, a farmer could use one composite 
inoculate product to treat many different crops. 
The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the product was a “new” and 
useful composition, concluded that “[i]t is no more than the discovery of some 
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.”  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.  
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Crucial to the Court’s analysis is its understanding that “[t]he bacteria perform in 
their natural way.  Their use in combination does not improve in any way their 
natural functioning.  They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite 
independently of any effort of the patentee.”  Id.  As these statements reflect, the 
critical inquiry in Funk Bros. is whether naturally occurring properties lie at the 
core of the claimed invention.  When the claimed advantages of an invention are 
little more than natural properties of the ingredients behaving in the manner for 
which nature intended them, the subject matter is not patent eligible. 
Myriad and several amici argue that the facts of the present case are more 
analogous to those addressed by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
and that Chakrabarty more than any other case supports the conclusion that 
Myriad’s composition claims are drawn to patentable subject matter.  But the Court 
in Chakrabarty does not deviate from the criteria employed in Funk Bros. and 
makes even clearer why the composition claims in the present case are invalid for 
lack of patentable subject matter. 
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court held that where an inventor introduced 
new genetic material within a bacterium cell, he had created something that was 
not a product of nature and was thus patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.  
§ 101.  In reaching its holding, the Court expressly recognized that patentable 
subject matter must exclude “laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract 
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ideas.”  The Court explained that the subject matter at issue fell outside of these 
categories because the “patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility.  His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; 
accordingly, it is patentable subject matter under § 101.”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 
310.   
To explain how the newly engineered bacterium was “markedly different” 
from natural products, the Supreme Court points primarily to the functional 
properties of the product.  It differentiates the new subject matter from products of 
nature by observing that its utility is based on a property “which is possessed by no 
naturally occurring bacteria.”  Id. at 305. The new bacterium in Chakrabarty fell 
on the side of human manufacture because its utility and suitability for claimed 
purposes derived from a property that did not occur in any bacteria naturally. 
The same cannot be said of the subject matter of Myriad’s BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 patents.  Isolated human gene sequences, whether extracted from cells or 
extracted and further purified into cDNA, are structurally and functionally identical 
to human gene sequences as they naturally occur.  The characteristics and function 
of a gene reside in the gene sequence—that is, the A’s, C’s, G’s, and T’s that code 
for the expression of a specific protein.  These characteristics and functions (the 
active portion of the gene sequence) have not been changed in “isolated” DNA.  
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The person claiming ownership of an isolated gene is seeking a monopoly on its 
natural functions—the ability of a gene sequence to anneal to its complementary 
strand (which allows diagnosis) and the ability to produce proteins.  The standard 
and criteria adopted in Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty for distinguishing unpatentable 
products of nature from patentable products of human manufacture clearly 
establish the unpatentability of “isolated DNA” whether it be merely extracted or 
further purified to cDNA.  The district court thus correctly held that isolated DNA 
cannot be patented under section 101. 
3. The District Court Properly Applied the Teachings of Funk 
Bros. and Chakrabarty 
 
Myriad concedes, as it must, that the exclusion of physical phenomena, 
natural laws, and abstract ideas from patentable subject matter is well-established 
by Supreme Court precedent.  Myriad Br. 17 and 33.  It instead faults the district 
court for using the term “products of nature” and for relying on the “markedly 
different characteristics” language from Chakrabarty.  Myriad Br. 41.  These 
arguments are specious.  First, the terms “physical phenomena” and “laws of 
nature,” which Myriad presumably accepts, are as broad or broader than the term 
“products of nature” and do not imply a different result when applied to the facts of 
this case.  Abstract terms such as these do not provide a self-sufficient interpretive 
means of distinguishing between patentable and unpatentable subject matter.  
Regardless of which term is used, the challenge for courts addressing patent 
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eligibility has been how to classify subject matter using general categories such as 
product of nature vs. human manufacture.  In facing this task, the district court 
properly relied on language from Chakrabarty to explain the considerations that 
should be analyzed on this issue.   
Myriad contends that the district court misuses the language “markedly 
different characteristics” to create a new legal standard.  This too is a red herring.  
The district court has properly adopted precise language employed by the 
Chakrabarty court as explanation for that Court’s holding.  These words are stated 
in Chakrabarty not as a passing observation, but as the Court’s explanation of what 
differentiates newly engineered bacterium from unpatentable products of nature. 
Myriad apparently introduces the dispute over nomenclature in order to 
obscure the fact that it can find no substantive basis for challenging the district 
court’s analysis of the precedents.  Certainly, Myriad has not proffered a more 
credible interpretive scheme.9 

9 Myriad seems to prefer the Chakrabarty court’s reference to language in 
Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609 (1887) describing a nonnaturally occurring 
human manufacture as “having a distinctive name, character [and] use.”  Myriad 
Br. 47.  Myriad does not explain how “having a distinctive name” might serve as a 
means of distinguishing between patentable and unpatentable subject matter.  
Moreover, the language of “distinctive character and use” does not advance the 
interpretive goal beyond, or even as far as, the Chakrabarty court’s own analysis in 
terms of “markedly different characteristics.” 
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4. The Mere Extraction and Purification of Human DNA Does 
Not Render it Patentable Subject Matter 
 
Myriad’s arguments wrongly suggest that the amount of human energy 
expended to extract and purify “isolated DNA” is prima facie evidence of human 
manufacture.  As Justice Breyer’s comments in Metabolite Labs. make clear, the 
amount of human energy exerted on a discovery is not material to its patent 
eligibility.  Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Moreover, a long line of cases have held that an isolated and purified product of 
nature is not patentable if the product functions in a way that is not significantly 
different than what occurs in nature.  As the Supreme Court wrote over a century 
ago: 
There are many things well known and valuable in medicine or in the 
arts which may be extracted from...substances.  But the extract is the 
same, no matter from what it has been taken.  A process to obtain it 
from a subject from which it has never been taken may be the creature 
of invention, but the thing itself when obtained cannot be called a new 
manufacture. 
 
American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 
593-94 (1874).  
In Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884), the 
Supreme Court considered a synthetic version of a dye that already existed in 
nature (alizarine), but the synthetic version had a brighter hue.  The Court held that 
“calling it artificial alizarine did not make it a new composition of matter, and 
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patentable as such, by reason of its having been prepared artificially for the first 
time from anthracine, if it was set forth as alizarine, a well known substance.”  Id. 
at 311.  
Most lower courts’ have held that isolated and purified products of nature 
are not patentable.  See e.g. In re Marden (Marden I), 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931) 
(purified uranium); In re Marden (Marden II), 47 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) 
(purified vanadium); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (purified 
ultramarine dye); Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1939) (purified cube 
plant root); Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928), 
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1928) (purified tungsten); Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. 
Comm’r Pat. 123 (purified pine needle fiber).10 
These cases further support the conclusion that any labor expended by 
Myriad in isolating the DNA sequence or isolating the coding region does not 
transform the natural product into a manufacture.  The resulting molecules and 
genetic sequences obtained are “fit only for the same beneficial uses as 

10 The one notable exception is Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912), where 
Judge Learned Hand held that purified adrenaline met the statutory requirement for 
novelty.  Parke-Davis & Co., 189 F. at 101-102. Despite Judge Learned Hand’s 
reputation as an important jurist, Parke-Davis has been heavily criticized and 
suffers from numerous infirmities.  Moreover, even if the decision had reflected 
the law at that time, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Funk Bros. and 
Chakrabarty make clear that Parke-Davis is not good law. 
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theretofore.”  American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex, Co., 283 U.S. 1, 12 
(1931). 
5. The DOJ’s Effort to Distinguish cDNA from Isolated DNA 
is Insupportable and Legally Immaterial 
 
The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted an Amicus brief 
agreeing with the district court that isolated DNA is not patent eligible, but 
asserting that cDNA is a human manufacture.  The DOJ does not and cannot 
provide a credible reading of legal precedent that would support the inclusion of 
cDNA among human-made products that differ markedly from native DNA.  The 
fact that cDNA requires additional procedures to isolate only the coding portions 
of DNA does not support a conclusion that cDNA is patent eligible.11  Regardless, 
the DOJ’s “middle position” on this subject turns out to be irrelevant to this 
Court’s decision because there are no claims at issue that are limited to cDNA.  It 
is not clear why the DOJ believes that it is entitled to read in such a limitation in 
claims 2 and 6 of the ’282 patent, but Myriad does not do so, nor has it challenged 
the district court’s broader construction of these particular claims.  Consequently, 
even if the DOJ’s distinction between isolated DNA having both coding and 

11 The DOJ’s arguments rest on the misconception that the amount of time and 
human energy expended to reveal natural tendencies is evidence of human 
manufacture.  As Justice Breyer’s comments in Metabolite Labs. point out, neither 
the amount of effort nor the cost of discovering a force of nature renders it 
patentable.  See also American Wood-Paper Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 593-94; 
American Fruit Growers, Inc., 283 U.S. at 12-13; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.   
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noncoding sequences and cDNA having only the coding sequence were 
supportable (and it is not), this Court need not reach that issue to affirm the district 
court’s Opinion in all respects. 
C. Myriad’s Patent Claims for Methods of “Comparing” Human 
Gene Sequences or Cell Growth Rates are Invalid 
 
The district court held that the method claims were invalid because they are 
directed to the abstract mental processes of comparing or analyzing gene sequences 
or even to the scientific method itself. 
Myriad challenges the disposition of its method claims by arguing various 
ways that the claims in-suit implicitly include certain processing and/or 
transformation steps that render the claimed subject matter more than mere 
observation and/or comparison of natural phenomena.  Myriad’s arguments rest on 
an impermissible attempt to read limitations into the method claims and must be 
rejected. 
1. The District Court Properly Construed the Claims Not to 
Include Additional Limitations 
 
The challenged method claims for “analyzing” or “comparing” DNA 
sequences require only a single step of “analyzing” or “comparing” sequences.  For 
example, the only identified step of claim 1 of the ’999 patent is (1) analyzing a 
sequence of (a) a BRCA1 gene or (b) BRCA1 RNA from a human sample, or (2) 
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analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from said human 
sample. 
Myriad does not dispute that the challenged claims do not explicitly claim 
the steps of isolating DNA or sequencing DNA.12  Instead, Myriad argues that the 
court should have construed the claims to include additional limitations of 
isolating and sequencing DNA based upon the phrase “sequence … from a human 
sample” found in some of the claims.13  Myriad Br. 17.  Myriad’s premise is that 
these claims “require extraction and processing of human tissue or blood samples.”  
Myriad Br. 55. 
 But Myriad only identifies alleged transformations that are not found in the 
claim language.  Specifically, Myriad impermissibly attempts to import at least the 
following steps into the claims based on the phrase “from a human sample”: (1) 
breaking open cells of a tissue sample; (2) extracting DNA or RNA from those 

12 None of the method claims include any version of the word “isolate,” and the 
term “sequence” is always used as a noun to describe the information being 
analyzed or compared. 
 
13  The district court correctly concluded that “from a human subject” “serve[s] 
only to specify the identity of the DNA or RNA sequence to be ‘analyzed’ or 
‘compared,” i.e., from a human sample as opposed to an animal sample or cell 
culture.”  (A235).  The identification of a sequence’s source is a reasonable, plain, 
and ordinary interpretation of the construed phrase “from a human subject” and is 
not at odds with the specification.  Moreover, the district court only needed to 
apply one reasonable interpretation of the phrase “from a human subject” in order 
to determine that the claim read on patent ineligible subject matter and was 
therefore invalid.  See Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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cells; and (3) using a diagnostic probe or primer to hybridize to the target DNA or 
RNA to initiate a sequencing reaction.  See Myriad Br. 56-57.  Despite well-settled 
law that patent claims cannot be limited to a specific embodiment unless the 
specification so teaches,14 Myriad asserts that these additional steps are required to 
practice the claimed steps of “analyzing” or “comparing.” 
Myriad looks to Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded, 130 S. 
Ct. 3543 (2010), to support its argument.  In Prometheus, this Court held that the 
claimed processes satisfied section 101 because they taught the transformation of 
the human body following administration of a drug and/or determination of the 
levels of the drug’s metabolites.  This Court concluded that “the presence of those 
two steps in the claimed process is not ‘merely’ for the purpose of gathering data,” 
but rather central to the invented process.  Id. at 1347.  
Prometheus is readily distinguishable.  The claims at issue in Prometheus 
were drafted to expressly include one or more of the two transformative steps.  
Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1340.  In contrast, Myriad’s claims were not drafted to 

14 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  The 
interpretation of the claim language should be consistent with the specification of 
the patent.  See id. at 1315-17.  For example, the inventor may give a special 
definition to a term other than its ordinary meaning, or may intentionally disclaim, 
or disavow, a claim’s scope.  Id. at 1316.  Myriad’s asserted additional limitations 
are not based upon these exceptions to a term’s ordinary meaning, but are an 
improper attempt to redefine the challenged claims. 
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include the proposed transformative steps that Myriad faults the district court for 
not importing as limitations.  For example, the claimed “determining” step in 
Prometheus is akin to Myriad’s unclaimed would-be limitations for the steps of 
“isolating” and “sequencing.” 
Moreover, Myriad’s asserted transformation steps are only performed to 
make the sequence information that naturally occurs in the body observable so that 
the analysis or comparison can be performed.  In fact, it is imperative that the 
sequence information is not altered by the additional steps or the claimed analysis 
is useless.15  In other words, they are merely data-gathering steps.  In contrast, in 
Prometheus, a transformation of the body achieved via an administered drug was 
central to the patent’s end—the claims in the Prometheus patent all required the 
determination of metabolites in relation to red blood cells, where the metabolites 
were based upon bodily changes to an administered drug.16   

15 Despite Myriad’s contradictions, the ordinary meaning of “sequence” to one 
skilled in the art would include a series of letters representing a linear order of 
nucleotides, as the specification confirms.  See e.g., ’999 patent 5:65-67 
(describing the series of letters in Figure 10 as “showing a genomic sequence of 
BRCA1”); ’857 patent 5:10-11 (describing the series of letters in Figure 3 as “the 
DNA sequence of the BRCA2 gene.”).  Regardless, the sequence information is the 
necessary aspect of the claims regardless if the term “sequence” is referred to as a 
molecule or a series of letters representing a nucleotide order.  In both cases, it is 
the information shown by the sequence that is being observed.   
 
16 See Patent No. 6,355,623 (showing that even claim 46 which did not include an 
“administering step” explicitly called for “determining the level … in a subject 
administered a drug”) (emphasis added). 
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The patent applicant for Myriad’s patents could have included the steps of 
determining a sequence from a sample in its claims if the applicant had intended to 
limit the claims to include such steps—as the applicant in the Prometheus patent 
did.17  Myriad cannot now seek to read in claim limitations without violating the 
prohibition against importing claim limitations from the specification.  See 
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323-24. 
2. Even Under Myriad’s Proposed Claim Construction, the 
Method Claims at Issue Are Directed to Patent Ineligible 
Subject Matter 
 
Under Myriad’s claim construction, the method claims for “analyzing” and 
“comparing” DNA sequences would include routine “isolating” and “sequencing” 
steps to determine the “sequence” for analysis or comparison.  See Myriad Br. 56-
57.  But even assuming these are “required”—though unclaimed—elements in the 
claims, they are “data gathering steps” that “are not central to the purpose of the 
claimed process.”  (A238).  Accordingly, even if it was proper, Myriad’s attempt to 
import limitations of “isolating” and “sequencing” DNA cannot save its invalid 
method claims.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
For example, claim 1 of the ’999 patent is “[a] method for detecting a 
germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene.”  (A463).  This is accomplished by 
“analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 RNA from a human sample 

17 However, Myriad’s additional limitations would not be sufficient to render the 
abstract ideas patent eligible.  See, infra, Section C2. 
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….”  (A463).  The only step central to the claim’s purpose of detecting a germline 
alteration is to analyze a sequence of a BRCA1 gene to presumably observe 
whether or not a specified alteration is within the sequence.  In other words, the 
“process”—retrieving the sequence of a BRCA1 gene from a human—is nothing 
more than data gathering for the purpose of the claim (i.e., the actual analysis of 
the sequence).18 
Myriad’s method claims for “analyzing” and “comparing” DNA sequences 
are patent-ineligible for an additional reason: the claims as a whole read on 
scientific principles—namely, the identification of a predisposition to breast cancer 
based on “analyzing” or “comparing” BRCAl/2 gene sequences.  See Diehr, 450 
U.S. at 191 (instructing that “when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or 
scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into 
whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract.”)  
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. 584) (recognizing that a 
limitation to one field of use or a limitation to token post-solution activity will not 
save a claim that, taken as a whole, is directed to patent ineligible subject matter 
and invalid).   

18 The other claims for “analyzing” and “comparing” are in accord with this 
example, and do not include a transformation that is central to the claim purpose of 
the claims even under Myriad’s construction.   
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Simply put, to consider Myriad’s proposed transformations19 as sufficient to 
satisfy section 101 “would effectively vitiate the limitations to claiming mental 
processes … since ‘to use virtually any natural phenomenon for virtually any 
useful purpose could well involve the use of empirical information obtained 
through an unpatented means that might have involved transforming matter.’”  
(A238) (citing Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (finding that instructing the use of well-known 
techniques to help establish inputs into the equation does not make the abstract 
idea patentable).  “To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade 
the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent 
protection.”  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.  
3. Application of the Scientific Method to a Natural 
Phenomena is an Abstract Process 
 
Myriad asserts that the step of “administering a substance to a cell in the 
expectation that the substance will slow its growth” in claim 20 of the ’282 patent 
is transformative and sufficient to render the claim patent eligible.  But Myriad’s 
claim broadly covers the scientific method for testing a reaction, which is a 
formulaic approach to determining cause and effect relationships.  In simple terms, 
this is a test wherein you (1) prepare a test sample having the hypothesized element 

19 In addition, the “isolating” and “sequencing” steps are not transformative as they 
are designed to determine and maintain the coding sequence of natural DNA, 
because the comparison step is useless if the coding sequence is transformed. 
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(i.e., the compound) and a control sample without the hypothesized element; (2) 
allow a reactionary process to occur (i.e., time for “growing”); (3) observe the 
results of both samples (i.e., compute and compare cell growth rates); and (4) draw 
a conclusion related to the original hypothesis (i.e., whether the compound is 
indicative of a cancer therapeutic).  This claim does nothing more than apply the 
scientific method to the particular technological environment surrounding the 
BRCA1 gene—a natural phenomena.  Merely limiting patent-ineligible material to 
a single field of use does not make a concept patentable.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3231 (finding a patent claim for the use of an abstract idea in the energy market 
was not patent eligible) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. 584); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 
191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent 
laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of 
the formula to a particular technological environment”). 
4. Observing a Natural Phenomena is an Abstract Process 
 
In addition to simply applying the scientific method to the BRCA1 
environment, claim 20 of the ’282 patent is directed to observing laws of nature 
dictating cell growth reactions and mentally correlating the cell growth reactions to 
a conclusion.  As the district court stated “the essence of the claim, when 
considered in its entirety, is the act of comparing cell growth rates and concluding 
that ‘a slower growth of said host cell in the presence of said compound is 
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indicative of a cancer therapeutic.’”  (A241).  Administering a substance to a cell is 
not sufficiently transformative to be patent eligible when considering the claim as a 
whole.  The purpose of administering a substance is to gather cell growth data for 
comparison with control cell growth data.  The information is evaluated to 
determine whether the substance is a potential cancer therapeutic—a mental 
process of observing a natural phenomenon. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In this case, decisions concerning the proper limits of patent protection have 
profound consequences for the lives of patients and their families.  For the reasons 
stated above, Amici urge the Court to affirm the district court’s opinion. 
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